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RÉSUMÉ — L’ontologie générale constitue un fondement théorique important pour
l’analyse, la conception et le développement dans les technologies de l’informa-
tion. L’ontologie est une branche de la philosophie qui étudie ce qui existe dans la
réalité. Une ontologie largement utilisée dans les systèmes d’information, en par-
ticulier pour la modélisation conceptuelle, est l’ontologie BWW (Bunge-Wand-We-
ber), fondée sur les idées du philosophe et physicien Mario Bunge, telles que syn-
thétisées par Wand et Weber. Cette ontologie a été élaborée à partir d’une
ancienne version de la philosophie de Bunge ; cependant, de nombreuses idées de
Bunge ont évolué depuis lors. Une question importante est donc la suivante : les
idées les plus récentes exprimées par Bunge appellent-elles une nouvelle ontolo-
gie ? Dans cet article, nous analyserons des travaux récents et antérieurs de Bunge
afin de répondre à cette question. Nous présentons une nouvelle ontologie basée
sur les travaux plus récents de Bunge que nous nommons ontologie systémiste
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bungéenne (Bunge’s Systemist Ontolgy ; BSO). Nous comparons ensuite BSO aux
constructions de BWW. La comparaison révèle à la fois un chevauchement consi-
dérable entre BSO et BWW, ainsi que des différences substantielles. À partir de
cette comparaison et de l’exposition initiale de BSO, nous proposons des sugges-
tions pour diverses études ontologiques et identifions des questions qui pourraient
alimenter un programme de recherche tant en modélisation conceptuelle qu’en
technologie de l’information en général.
ABSTRACT — General ontology is a prominent theoretical foundation for infor-
mation technology analysis, design, and development. Ontology is a branch of phi-
losophy which studies what exists in reality. A widely used ontology in information
systems, especially for conceptual modeling, is the BWW (Bunge–Wand–Weber),
which is based on ideas of the philosopher and physicist Mario Bunge, as synthe-
sized by Wand and Weber. The ontology was founded on an early subset of
Bunge’s philosophy; however, many of Bunge’s ideas have evolved since then. An
important question, therefore, is: do the more recent ideas expressed by Bunge
call for a new ontology? In this paper, we conduct an analysis of Bunge’s earlier
and more recent works to address this question. We present a new ontology based
on Bunge’s later and broader works, which we refer to as Bunge’s Systemist Ontol-
ogy (BSO). We then compare BSO to the constructs of BWW. The comparison re-
veals both considerable overlap between BSO and BWW, as well as substantial dif-
ferences. From this comparison and the initial exposition of BSO, we provide
suggestions for further ontology studies and identify research questions that could
provide a fruitful agenda for future scholarship in conceptual modeling and other
areas of information technology.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Human society is relentlessly increasing its reliance on information technology
(IT). This reliance will only grow stronger as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic,
providing a new impetus to move even more human activities online (Watson et
al. 2020; Weinhardt et al. 2020). The human world is becoming digital, which is
happening especially rapidly since the last decade and a half (Floridi 2012;
Recker et al. 2021; Yoo and Lyytinen 2005). It is thus particularly concerning
that the IT projects that support this digitalization frequently fail (Gupta et al.
2019; Nelson 2007). IT usability is often low (Eveleigh et al. 2014; Stephanidis
et al. 2019); digital data continues to be of poor quality (Batini et al. 2015; Daniel
et al. 2018). These problems have a common characteristic in that they either
directly or indirectly deal with how IT shapes and represents real-world do-
mains.
It is critical to build IT based on solid theoretical and methodological founda-
tions (Guerreiro, van Kervel, and Babkin 2013; Henderson-Sellers 2015; Weber
1997). However, IT development often continues to be conducted in an ad hoc
manner, with the outcomes heavily dependent on the skills and training of de-
velopers (Anderson et al. 2013; Duboue 2020; Pastor 2016). At its core, infor-
mation technologies manipulate symbols making it further important to ensure
that the relationship between the symbols upon which IT is based, is anchored
appropriately in their real-life referents (Weber 1997). For example, the physi-
cal inventory of cars at a dealership may be represented symbolically using bi-
nary patterns stored on a computer hard drive and managed and organized by a
database management system. The database, in turn, can be accessible to pro-
spective buyers over the Internet via a web interface. In order for the prospec-
tive customers of the dealership to gain an accurate knowledge of what cars are
actually available, it is essential to ensure that correct patterns of bits and bytes
are properly governed by the database management system. The patterns, in
turn, must be correctly designed based on the accurate model of the car dealer-
ship domain. Hence, the goal of building better IT involves the investigation of
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the relationship between what is being stored and manipulated in a computer
and its real-world referents.
Historically, one of the most prolific and effective foundations for IT analysis,
design and development has been ontology. Ontology is a branch of philosophy
that studies what exists in reality, as well as what reality is (Gonzalez-Perez
2015; Guizzardi 2005). In this research, we focus on a general ontology, also
known as a foundational or upper level ontology. A general ontology can provide
IT development with theoretically grounded, consistent, formalized and rigor-
ous meaning for the basic notions of what exists in reality.5
Due to their potential to put IT development on stronger methodological
foundations, ontological studies are widely embraced by the IT community. Ap-
plications are especially prolific in research on semantic web (Berners-Lee, Hen-
dler, and Lassila 2001; Burton-Jones, Purao, and Storey 2002), which aims to
move beyond syntactic matches to deeper interoperability, and on conceptual
data and process modeling which develops representations of application do-
mains and user requirements (Mayr and Thalheim 2020; Mylopoulos 1998;
Recker et al. 2021). Ontologies have also been used in knowledge management,
artificial intelligence, interface design, database schema integration, analysis of
software performance, information quality, and other applications (Ferrandis,
Pastor, and Guizzardi 2013; Guarino 1995; Guizzardi 2005; Pastor, España, and
González 2008; Recker, Rosemann, and Krogstie 2007; Reinhartz-Berger, Itzik,
and Wand 2014; Storey, Goldstein, and Ullrich 2002; Verdonck et al. 2019; Wand
and Wang 1996; Weber 2021). Empirical benefits of adopting a specific domain
ontology for conceptual modeling or to improve data quality have been docu-
mented (Bera, Burton-Jones, and Wand 2014; Bodart et al. 2001; Burton-Jones
and Weber 2014; Cheng, Lu, and Sheu 2009; Lukyanenko, Parsons, and Wiersma
2014; Recker et al. 2011; Sugumaran and Storey 2002; Verdonck et al. 2019).
Various general ontologies have been used for IT analysis, design and devel-
opment. Prominent examples include Unified Foundational Ontology (UFO)
(Guizzardi et al. 2015), social ontology of Searle (March and Allen 2014), General
Formal Ontology (Herre 2010), DOLCE (Gangemi et al. 2002), Phenomenological
Foundational Ontology (PFO) (Jonsson and Enquist 2019), ResearchCYC
5 A general ontology is thus different from a domain ontology. A domain ontology is a description (often
formal) of constructs in a particular domain (McDaniel and Storey 2019). Examples include an ontology
of Software Defects, Errors and Failures (Duarte et al. 2018), database design (Sugumaran and Storey
2002; 2006), or ontology of research validity (Lukyanenko, Larsen, et al. 2019), and many others in di-
verse domains (McDaniel and Storey 2019; Purao and Storey 2005).
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(Conesa, Storey, and Sugumaran 2010), and others (for more discussion, see, e.g.,
Guizzardi 2005).
A major ontology for conceptual modeling and other IT applications is the
Bunge-Wand-Weber (BWW), based on works of the philosopher and physicist
Mario Bunge (1919–2020), and synthesized and applied by Wand and Weber
and colleagues (Wand, Storey, and Weber 1999; Wand and Weber 1988; 1995).
The BWW has been applied in theoretical, empirical and design research across
a wide range of disciplines (Wand and Weber 2017; Burton-Jones et al. 2017). It
has also provided the conceptual background to design and implement concep-
tual programming-based tools (Embley, Liddle, and Pastor 2011; Pastor and Mo-
lina 2007), which facilitate the design of an ontology-driven conceptual model-
ing system with industrial support (e.g., Integranova, www.integranova.com).
At the same time, the BWW ontology has been criticized (e.g., Wyssusek
2006), especially with respect to the assumptions underlying the ontology roots;
that is, the philosophical beliefs of Bunge. Notably, BWW was developed on a
subset of Bunge’s ontology (1977; 1979) which is now over 40 years old. Since
the publication of these two primary sources for the BWW ontology, Bunge pub-
lished over 100 books and 300 papers (Bunge et al. 2019), in which his ideas
were further expanded, refined, and sometimes altered. These additional writ-
ings lead to the following research questions.
Is there a need to revise the original BWW? Are statements such as “Bunge
believes the world is made of things” still appropriate, given the evolution of
Bunge’s work? Is an expansion of BWW needed (Rosemann & Wyssusek, 2005)
or do the ideas expressed by Bunge, which are not part of BWW, call for a new
ontology? Can the initial tenets of this new ontology be formulated? What are
the implications of such a new ontology for the development and use of IT?
To address these research questions, we first discuss the basic tenets of BWW
to establish a common understanding of Bunge’s ideas. We then consider the
more recent ideas of Bunge and present them as a proposed, new ontology,
which we call Bunge’s Systemist Ontology (BSO). The new ontology is compared
to BWW, the results of the comparison are discussed and implications for future
research are detailed.
2 BACKGROUND: BUNGE–WAND–WEBER ONTOLOGY
Yair Wand and Ron Weber offer a first-hand account (Wand and Weber 2017) of
their motivation to ground information systems research in a foundational
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ontology, as well as of how they developed a set of theories based on what be-
came known as the Bunge-Wand-Weber ontology (BWW). The theories were:
ontological expressiveness, a representation model, and a good-decomposition
model. Although they consulted other sources, the primary foundation of BWW
are two seminal manuscripts on ontology by Bunge (1977; 1979), which are part
of his eight-volume Treatise on Basic Philosophy.
The BWW ontology (Wand and Weber 1988; 1995; 1990a) argues that the
world is made of things—substantial individuals—which possess properties.
Things may form composite things and interact with each other, leading to the
acquisition of new properties or loss of existing properties. Properties are not
directly accessible to human observers, resulting in the notion of attributes,
which humans ascribe to things, but which may or may not be accurate or com-
plete representations of the underlying properties. Sets of things form systems
if, for any bi-partitioning of the set, coupling exists among things in the two sub-
sets. The main constructs from Bunge as adopted into BWW are: thing, property,
attributes, functional schema, state, law, state space, event, history, coupling,
system, class, kind, and their derivatives (e.g., lawful state space) (see Table 1, p.
222 in Wand and Weber 1993)
The BWW ontology, as well as the theories, models and methods derived
from it, have been used widely in conceptual, empirical and design work in in-
formation systems, conceptual modeling, software engineering and other areas
(Wand and Weber 2017), making it an important development in the area of on-
tology in IT (Jabbari et al. 2018). Despite its influence (Jabbari et al. 2018; Recker
et al. 2021; Saghafi and Wand 2014), the ontology has been criticized for its nar-
row physicalist focus, lack of attention to social and psychological phenomena,
and postulates which may be problematic for modeling certain types of domain
rules. Examples are proscribed optional properties, denied independent exist-
ence of properties, and properties of properties (Guizzardi 2005; March and Al-
len 2014; Veres and Mansson 2004; Wyssusek 2006).
A generally overlooked issue is that the BWW ontology is based on only se-
lected references from Bunge. Although there were some attempts to expand
BWW to incorporate other ideas of Bunge (Rosemann and Wyssusek 2005),
these were still narrow in scope and did not realize widespread adoption.
The basis for BWW is two, albeit seminal, manuscripts by Bunge. However,
as Bunge frequently noted, ontology is inseparable from other beliefs, such as on
how to acquire knowledge in the world (Bunge 2006). Indeed, the Treatise con-
tained many additional beliefs, related to semantics, epistemology,
Roman Lukyanenko, Veda C. Storey, Oscar Pastor | Foundations of Information Technology 7
Mεtascience | No.2 | online February 5, 2021
methodology, ethics, and technology. During the 40 years since the publication
of the 1977 and 79 volumes, and even since the last book of the Treatise on ethics
(Bunge 1989), Bunge published over 400 manuscripts, in which his ideas were
further expanded, refined, and sometimes, altered.6 Some of these more recent
ideas are of great potential relevance to IT, because they directly dealt with is-
sues of information technology (e.g., Bunge 2019).
3 FUNDAMENTALS FOR CONSTRUCTING BUNGE’S SYSTEMIST ONTOLOGY
The task of understanding the differences between Bunge’s ideas enshrined in
BWW and his other, and more recent thinking, meets a challenge: the ideas
which comprised BWW were carefully distilled, whereas the more recent ideas
were not. Although based on two volumes, BWW was founded on a self-con-
tained Treatise on Basic Philosophy which developed and presented ideas sys-
tematically and with great internal consistency. These began with semantics
(Bunge 1974), then ontology (Bunge 1977), followed by epistemology (Bunge
1983), methodology (Bunge 1983) and ethics (Bunge 1989). In contrast, Bunge’s
works since the Treatise (1974–89) are not assembled into a dedicated, self-con-
tained single compendium. Rather, it is a collection of over 400 essays, papers
and books (Bunge 2006; 1996; 2017; 2018; 2019), which require dedicated syn-
thesis.7
To address our research questions, we, thus, engaged in a comprehensive and
systematic effort to catalog and distill these beliefs. This project was conducted
over five years (2015–2020) and includes the last known publication by the late
Bunge.
First, we began to assemble a library of publications by Bunge and conducted
a scoping survey of his writings to gain a preliminary understanding of the ex-
tent of the modifications and expansions compared with BWW. Second, half-way
into the process, the first author of this paper contacted Mario Bunge, who kindly
agreed to meet and presented a general overview of his earlier and most recent
thinking, answering numerous clarifying questions. Third, we reviewed all
6 An example of a reversal is Bunge’s admiration for Marxism-Leninism (an extensive set of beliefs trans-
cending the general public’s most familiar ideas about politics and economy). It was Bunge’s first major
philosophical doctrine, according to his own confessions. But over the years he distanced himself and,
eventually, became a vehement critic of Marxist-Leninist “ontology and politics” (Bunge et al. 2019, vii;
Bunge 2016).
7 For example, although Bunge has made a stronger emphasis toward systems, his recent writing is still
rich in references to things, including in the same texts where he discusses systems being preferable to
the notion of things (Bunge 2017, 174).
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pertinent publications using Google Scholar and Bunge et al., (2019) as sources.8
Fourth, we followed the logical path outlined in the Treatise (i.e., ontology, epis-
temology, methodology and ethics) as re-iterated and explained by Bunge in
other sources (e.g., Bunge 2006) to catalog the ideas. We began with basic as-
sumptions about reality, followed by the problem of knowledge of reality, and
then the application and use of knowledge in society (e.g., in policymaking, sci-
ence and daily life). Fifth, we began synthesizing the ideas, favoring the most re-
cent publications (e.g., Bunge 2017; 2018) and referencing earlier publications
(e.g., Bunge 2006), Bunge’s own memoirs (Bunge 2016), and authoritative stud-
ies on Bunge (Bunge et al. 2019), for clarification or expansion of ideas, as
needed.9
The intended result is a systematic synthesis of Bunge’s publications aimed
at distilling and presenting a single, coherent and consistent set of beliefs with
the aim of using these ideas within the context of information technology. Bunge
kindly clarified some of the ideas of his ontology and also shared a copy of his
unpublished manuscript.10 However, all claims made here are justified either
through direct references to published works by Bunge or are explicitly noted as
our inferences and derivations.
To report the findings, we analyze the constructs of BWW (Table 1, p. 222
Wand & Weber, 1993) and compare them to what we coin as Bunge’s Systemist
Ontology (BSO). The BSO captures broader and more recent set of ideas devel-
oped by Bunge. Indeed, Bunge uses multiple labels to describe his set of beliefs
(e.g., “emergentist materialism” (Bunge 2003), “hylorealism” (Bunge 2006, 27)),
but the most frequently used term appears to be “systemism” (Bunge 1979;
2000; 2018), thus giving the name to the new ontology. This label was also con-
firmed to be preferable by Bunge himself during our interactions with the phi-
losopher-physicist.
8 https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=7MmcYgEAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao
9 Bunge describes systems in (Bunge 1996, 270), and in many other sources. To obtain a more detailed
discussion of properties of systems, one can consult, for example, (Bunge 2006, 10–19).
10 This was during a personal meeting with Mario Bunge at his residence in Montreal, Canada in Septem-
ber 2018.
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4 UNDERSTANDING BUNGE’S RECENT WORKS
We first compare BSO with BWW by focusing on the constructs they have in com-
mon. Since BSO is broader than BWW, we also provide an overview of the con-
structs in BSO that extend beyond those of BWW.
4.1 BUNGE’S SYSTEMIST ONTOLOGY VERSUS BWW
The BSO claims reality is all that we know to exist and distinguishes five “kinds”
or “levels” of reality, including physical, chemical, biological, social and technical
(Bunge 1996, 25). One level emerges from another (e.g., social from biological)
via emergent properties (discussed later) and higher levels are grounded in the
underlying physical level.
The BWW ontology postulates that reality is made of things, which have prop-
erties (Bunge 1977, 26–29). Things are “substantial individuals,” which could be
composed of other individuals or be simple, structureless and atomic (Wand and
Weber 1990a, 126). However, many things also form systems, which have things
as their components. Hence, Bunge poignantly titled his 1979 volume of the
Treatise, “Ontology II: A World of Systems” (Bunge 1979).
In his most recent writings, Bunge put forward a more intriguing idea: every
thing is likely a system, which we deem an essential claim of BSO. In BSO a system
is the ontological primitive. Per BSO, the world is made of systems. What precipi-
tated this change for Bunge and what is its basis? We suggest the postulate “the
world is made of systems” is grounded in three more recent beliefs of Bunge.
First, using the notion of a system allowed Bunge to reason about entities for
which the notion of a thing was either ontologically inapplicable with respect to
modern scientific knowledge (e.g., consider photon’s wave-particle duality), or
linguistically awkward. Bunge (2017) explains (p. 174):
The word ‘system’ is more neutral than ‘thing’, which in most cases denotes
a system endowed with mass and perhaps tactually perceptible; we find it
natural to speak of a force or field as a system, but we would be reluctant
to call it a thing.
Second, Bunge, following recent advances in particle physics, became con-
vinced that there are no simple, structureless entities. Bunge (2017) explains
(p. 174, emphasis added):
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By calling all existent “concrete systems” we tacitly commit ourselves in
tune with growing suspicion in all scientific quarters—that there are no sim-
ple, structureless entities.
Bunge notes that the history of science teaches us that things once thought to
be irreducible and fundamentally simple (e.g., atom), have later proven to be
complex. Bunge asserts that simple and structureless things, if exist at all, exist
only at the quantum level (Bunge 2000, 148):
Only particle physicists study non-systems, such as quarks, electrons, and
photons. But they know that all such simple things are parts of systems or
will eventually be absorbed by some system.
Thus the idea that “there are no simple, structureless entities” is not only an
ontological, but also a normative belief: “[t]his is a programmatic hypothesis
found fertile in the past, because it has stimulated the search for complexities
hidden under simple appearances” (Bunge 2017, 174). It may very well be that
the elementary particles of today (e.g., quarks, bosons) presently considered
atomic, in time can be found to be complex. In numerous of his writings, Bunge
stresses that he views his ontology, not only as a theory of what exists, but also
as a normative template for the kinds of questions to ask when inquiring about
the nature of reality (Bunge 1996; 2006; 2016).
 Third, systemism for Bunge offered a more balanced approach for describing
reality (an idea of especial interest to conceptual modeling in IT). For Bunge, sys-
temism holds numerous advantages, as it conceptually lies between individual-
ism (which under-represents internal structures of a system, its relationship
with the outer environment, its levels of composition and emergence) and ho-
lism (which is not interested in the components and specificity of subsystems).
Systemism represents the best of these two ideas, without sacrificing the bene-
fits of each (Bunge 2000). This is how Agazzi, a friend and close associate of
Bunge, summarizes his views, which he debated with Bunge extensively (Agazzi
2019):
[Bunge] explicitly presents his position (which he calls “systemism”) as in-
termediate between two erroneous extremes, “atomism” and “holism”.
The weakness of atomism resides in that it ignores the relevance of prop-
erties and especially relations, without which it is impossible to distinguish
a single “aggregate” from a “system”. The weakness of holism resides (ac-
cording to Bunge) in its pretension that the knowledge of the whole must
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precede and make possible the knowledge of the parts. Systemism avoids
both mistakes by recognizing that the whole “results” from the correlation
of its parts and at the same time has influence on their functioning.
Thus, the tenet that “the world is made of systems” is an ontological hypoth-
esis and a normative postulate. It offers interesting possibilities for modeling in
IT, as discussed later. However, it also offers a notable challenge. Indeed, it could
be possible that there are no simple, structureless entities and that even elemen-
tary particles may be systems (i.e., composed of other systems), yet this possi-
bility implies an infinite recursion. Within the context of IT, we suggest two ways
to address this problem, while simultaneously providing the foundation for fu-
ture studies to conduct a dedicated analysis of this issue.
First, the majority of extant applications of IT deal with domains beyond the
domain of elementary particles and quantum physics. For example, the typical
use cases of systems analysis and design such as ERP, social media, e-commerce,
personal productivity software, deal with entities such as customers, suppliers,
orders, social media friends. These entities are indeed systems and are com-
posed of other systems which in turn are composed of other systems. This is an
important realization, because it liberates such applications from the need to re-
solve the fundamental ontological status of the “component” or “system part”
and deal with the possible infinity of subsystems.
Second, some applications do engage with elementary particles and may in-
volve modeling entities, for which there is no presently known structure (e.g.,
quarks, bosons) (Seiden 2005). For these cases, we suggest using Bunge’s con-
struct of a system, but not showing the components of it. Indeed, as Bunge sug-
gested, the notion of a thing would not suffice for some of the entities in this
domain (e.g., forces, fields, photons). In such an approach, the construct of a sys-
tem is, not only a construct of convenience, but also a hypothesis based on the
most recent speculation of Bunge that such elementary particle may, indeed,
have structure that could be discovered later. Thus, adopting BSO within the
context of IT allows us to potentially remove the notion of a thing, simply replac-
ing it with the system construct.
Having established the basic tenet of BSO, we now consider the basic notions
related to systems. In the Treatise, Bunge postulated that any system should
have “a definite composition, a definite environment, and a definite structure.
The composition of the system is the set of its components; the environment, the
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set of items with which it is connected; and the structure, the relations among
its components as well as among these and the environment” (Bunge 1979, 4).
In later writings, this initial idea was developed into a Composition, Environ-
ment, Structure and Mechanism or CESM model. In CESM in addition to the com-
position, environment, and structure (present in BWW), Bunge added “mecha-
nism” (Bunge 2000). Mechanism is defined as “characteristic processes, that
make [the system] what it is and the peculiar ways it changes” (Bunge 2006,
126). The CESM model is a principal model of systems in BSO, which can be used
to reason about and describe systems. To illustrate, Bunge provides an example
of a traditional nuclear family—a type of a social system (Bunge 2006, 127):
Its components are the parents and the children; the relevant environment
is the immediate physical environment, the neighborhood, and the work-
place; the structure is made up of such biological and psychological bonds
as love, sharing, and relations with others; and the mechanism consists es-
sentially of domestic chores, marital encounters of various kinds, and child
rearing. If the central mechanism breaks down, so does the system as a
whole.
The inversion of the relationship between things and systems, and the poten-
tial obviation of the need for things in BSO, represents a major change, as the
construct of thing has been a founding one for BWW and has been the conceptual
foundation for many studies that adopted BWW (Lukyanenko, Parsons, and
Wiersma 2014; Parsons and Wand 2000; Pastor and Molina 2007; Wand, Storey,
and Weber 1999). However, things in the social and technical levels of early
Bunge were effectively systems (Bunge 1979). This change can be easily accom-
modated by much of the prior work that used BWW with a mere replacement of
a label.
As in BWW, BSO upholds beliefs about the relationship between systems and
properties. Systems have properties. Properties do not exist outside of systems
(Bunge 2017, 175): “Property-less entities would be unknowable, hence the hy-
pothesis of their existence is untestable; and disembodied properties and rela-
tions are unknown.” As in BWW, properties according to BSO do not exist in
themselves: “However, … can be material only derivatively …: there are neither
properties nor relations in themselves, except by abstraction.” (Bunge 2006, 11).
Notions of classes and kinds are used in BSO. In BWW, classes are sets of
things sharing “a common property”, whereas kinds are sets of things which
share “two or more” properties (Wand and Weber 1993, 223). Systems with
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“one or more” common properties in BSO (Bunge 1996, 111) form classes and
those with properties which are interrelated, form kinds (Bunge 2006, 13).
The emphasis on systems carries other implications, as this new postulate is
propagated throughout Bunge’s recent works. According to BSO, some, but not
all (an important caveat), systems undergo change, resulting in emergence (ad-
dition of new) or submergence (loss of old) of properties. To account for this
situation, BSO continues to use the construct of state. Bunge (2017, 171) defines
state as “the list of the properties of the thing at that time.” This definition is
similar to that of BWW (Bunge 1977, 125). A state can describe multiple prop-
erties (at the same moment in time) (Bunge 2006). A given system has the prop-
erties of its subsystems, as well as its own, termed emergent properties (an idea
unchanged since BWW), but now gaining greater focus in BSO, as a key implica-
tion of systemism.
In BWW, there are postulates that deal with changes of states (i.e., events)
and how the properties that make up the states are perceived by humans (i.e.,
attributes) (Bunge 1977). Whereas BWW applied the notion of a state to all
things (Bunge 1977, 123), per BSO, Bunge (2006) makes an important distinc-
tion between systems which undergo change and those that do not. Per BSO,
Bunge distinguishes two kinds of system: conceptual and concrete (Bunge 1996,
270). A conceptual (or formal) system is a system all the components of which
are conceptual (e.g., propositions, classifications, and hypothetico-deductive
systems-i.e., theories). This is contrasted with concrete (or material) systems
which are made of concrete components (i.e., subsystems, such as atoms, organ-
isms, and societies), and may undergo change.11
What distinguishes concrete and conceptual systems is the essential prop-
erty of mutability, as a key element of BSO, which only concrete systems possess:
“mutability is the one property shared by all concrete things, whether natural or
artificial, physical or chemical, biological or social, perceptible or imperceptible”
(Bunge 2006, 10). Bunge thus explains that changes in systems may only occur
if the systems are concrete (Bunge 2006, 11):
heat propagation, metabolism, and ideation qualify as material since they
are processes in material things. By contrast, logical consistency, commu-
tativity, and differentiability can only be predicated of mathematical ob-
jects.
11 Bunge (1996, 270) also distinguishes a symbolic (or semiotic) system as a type of a concrete system
some components of which stand for or represent other objects.
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Concrete systems change in the virtue of energy transfer. For Bunge, “the
technical word for ‘changeability’ is energy” (Bunge 2006, 12), such that:
To repeat, energy is not just a property among many. Energy is the universal
property, the universal par excellence.
We, thus, obtain a more formal definition of a concrete system in BSO as a sys-
tem that has energy (Bunge 2006, 12).
In BSO, when systems interact, they transfer energy from one to another.
Bunge dedicates considerable time to the notion of energy. He considers differ-
ent kinds of energy, including mechanical, thermal, kinetic, potential, electric,
magnetic, gravitational, chemical (e.g., in Bunge 2006). Energy transfer leads to
change in states of things, as they acquire or lose their properties. This produces
events and processes. Energy when paired with artificial code (instructions
which correspond to ways to understand meaning) may transmit information;
that is, carry meaning for an observer. This idea is not found in BWW, but of
special relevance to information technology.
In contrast to concrete systems, conceptual systems do not change since they,
themselves, do not possess energy. Naturally, in thinking about and communi-
cating conceptual systems, energy transfer occurs. However, this energy trans-
fer occurs within and between concrete systems (i.e., humans who are thinking
and communicating these ideas). Bunge suggests that per se, conceptual systems
do not harbor energy. They are mental tools that humans use to reason about
concrete and other conceptual systems. Conceptual systems cannot transfer en-
ergy from one conceptual system to another. Conceptual systems, therefore, do
not change per se; what changes is the knowledge of them in the mind of the
observer (i.e., a concrete system). One conceptual system can be replaced by an-
other when the latter is found to be more useful, convenient or expedient in
some other way (e.g., simpler to remember or learn).
The consequence of the re-definition of systems as either energy-bearing or
not, implies another change compared to BWW. Thus, whereas in BWW an event
has been understood as a “change in state of a thing” (Wand and Weber 1993,
222), in BSO, an event is understood in terms of energy, thus being applicable
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only to concrete systems12. Bunge views event as an energy-involving construct
(Bunge 2006, 91):
Event C in thing A causes event E in thing B if and only if the occurrence of
C generates an energy transfer from A to B resulting in the occurrence of E.
Multiple events form processes, defined as “a sequence, ordered in time, of
events such that every member of the sequence takes part in the determination
of the succeeding member” (Bunge 2017, 172).
The demarcation between events applicable to concrete versus conceptual
systems affects the definition of the notion of law, which is now applicable to
concrete systems only. Laws are stable patterns which hold “independently of
human knowledge or will” (Bunge 1996, 27). In BSO, conceptual systems do not
obey laws, but rather obey rules of logic or other considerations imposed by hu-
mans who create or use these systems (Bunge 2006).
4.2 BSO BEYOND BWW
Although Bunge considered himself an ontologist, for him the connection be-
tween ontology and epistemology was inseparable. Notably, however, issues of
ontology, epistemology, methodology and ethics were separated into standalone
volumes in the Treatise. This could potentially explain why BWW focused on the
constructs related to material reality. In recent writings, Bunge enmeshes the
discussion about systems and their properties with epistemological issues
within the same volumes. As a result, in BSO, the connection between his onto-
logical beliefs and his beliefs about the nature of knowledge of reality becomes
explicit.
In BSO, an event or a process as it appears to some human subject is termed
phenomenon (Bunge 2017, 173). It is an occurrence registered by the sensory
apparatus of humans or other animals triggered by a change or a series of
changes in the state of a concrete system. For example, the sensation of wind
blowing in the face or an act of watching YouTube videos produce a complex
chain of biochemical reactions in humans who experience these events. These
sensations are produced by the interaction between systems external to the hu-
man observer and the human observer (who is a system also) (Bunge 1996).
Phenomena, therefore, are special kinds of energy transfer, present when
12 This may potentially resolve the criticisms levied against Bunge’s ontology as being too physicalist
(March and Allen 2014; Wyssusek 2006). The original ideas of Bunge captured in BWW without explicit
qualification have indeed been casted by BSO as belonging only to material reality.
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sentient beings are interacting with the world. Phenomena may arise due to di-
rect interaction with physical systems (e.g., pressing an elevator button) or indi-
rectly (e.g., via a signal or information). Phenomena are always “in the intersec-
tion of the external world with the cognitive subject” (Bunge 2017, 173).
Events, processes, phenomena, and concrete systems are material instances
of the mental concept of fact. That is, they lie “in the extension of the concept of
fact” (Bunge 2017, 174). Thus, Bunge uses the notion of fact (which is an episte-
mological construct) to group important related ontological constructs that have
special relevance to humans. Facts for Bunge are kinds of objects: “whatever is
or may become a subject of thought or action” (Bunge 2017, 174). What makes
them special compared to other types of objects is that facts are “known or as-
sumed—with some ground—to belong to reality” (Bunge 2017, 171). It does not
appear that Bunge seeks to demarcate reality from non-reality (Bunge believed
in a single world). Rather, Bunge indicates that all objects belong to reality, with
only facts representing specific, important aspects of systems. Through the fact
construct, BSO connects the fundamental ideas concerning the composition of
reality to the mental world of humans.
Bunge asserts that phenomena are merely small fractions of the facts consti-
tuting the object of an investigation. This makes Bunge equate phenomena with
“observable facts” that is, the facts that can be sensed directly. As BSO states, “the
observable facts or phenomena are data suggesting or confirming the existence
of more interesting facts behind” (Bunge 2017, 177).
It is a subject of centennial debates in philosophy whether human observers
have access to more than just phenomena. The position of the phenomenalism
holds that only direct sensations and experiences are knowable (Hirst 2002). In
contrast, various strands of realism generally posit that reality beyond sensa-
tions can be known (Hempel 1966). This can be accomplished with the aid of
experimentation, theory testing, imagination and logical inference. Bunge is a
proponent of the latter (Bunge 2017). For Bunge (2017), the pragmatic benefit
of realism is that it encourages thinking and action beyond sensations and moti-
vates an active, inquisitive stance toward reality.
For Bunge, facts are iceberg-like in that they are largely submerged under the
surface of immediate sensory experience. Furthermore, the phenomena are of-
ten quite different from the concrete systems upon which they are based. An ex-
ample is the difference between the visual sensations caused by a flash of light-
ning compared with the actual chemical and electric other physical processes
involved in the unraveling of this concrete system.
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In both BWW and in BSO, Bunge distinguishes between properties and attrib-
utes. However, it is BSO that offers an expanded explanation for what constitutes
an attribute. An attribute is a mental concept (i.e., an object of thought), which
may correspond to phenomena. When we, as humans, experience lightning, we
experience a bundle of properties associated with this complex concrete system.
However, not all sensory experiences related to lightning have associated attrib-
utes. Thus, we may label lightning as “bright” and “dangerous”, but generally do
not have an established attribute to describe specific smells associated with
lightning. In other words, certain properties of systems may be experienced as
phenomena, with some of the phenomena grouped into attributes human find
useful. However, not every attribute can be traced to an underlying property.
Because attributes are mental objects, Bunge admits there is a possibility of hu-
mans having attributes that may not correspond to any underlying physical
properties of material systems (e.g., “magical” is an attribute of a shield of a fic-
titious hero). Thus, not all attributes are grounded in phenomena.
Bunge extensively deals with non-observable facts or what he calls, “sub-
merged” facts. For Bunge, they are especially interesting because they under-
score the value of science and scientific thinking for humans. Since most reality
is inaccessible to direct observation, it must be hypothesized. A hypothesis is a
conjecture about the relationship between the observed and the unobserved
facts (Bunge 2017). A hypothesis need not be a scientific one. Humans routinely
hypothesize, without being consciously aware of doing so. For example, when
looking out of the window, we may observe clouds forming in the sky. Doing so
may lead us to take an umbrella when we venture outside. These physical events
are linked with a number of hypotheses about the relationship between facts
about systems.
For Bunge more interesting hypotheses are those which require extensive
elaboration and thinking. These types of hypotheses, although still present in
day-to-day life, are most commonly found in science. To test such hypotheses,
definite relationships between the unobserved and the observed facts must be
developed, by which the observed can count as evidence for, or against, the ex-
istence of the hypothetically unseen, and the unseen can explain what can be
seen. These relationships are represented by hypotheses and theories (Bunge
2017, 177).
To reason about deeper levels of reality, one needs to connect phenomena
with unobserved systems. Hence, observation becomes a key construct of BSO at
the nexus of ontology and epistemology. Observation is defined as “purposeful
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and enlightened perception” (Bunge 2017, 181). It is purposeful or deliberate
because it is made with a deliberate goal and enlightened because it is guided by
prior knowledge of the observer. The object of observation is a fact in either the
external or the inner world of the observer. The former, for example, can be the
sight of an approaching passer-by, whereas the latter could be thoughts, memo-
ries, and mental images that are available to the observer through introspection.
The subject or observer includes, of course, their perceptions. The circum-
stances of observation are the environment of the object and subject. Both the
observation media and the body of relevant knowledge are means for the ob-
server, but not for the instrument designer or for the theoretician. Observation
statements have the following form: “w observes x under y with the help of z”.
There is no “end” to the BSO per se. Recall that BSO is not published in a self-
contained treatise. Bunge continuously stresses the interdependency between
ontology and other beliefs. Indeed, Wand and Weber engaged with other ideas
of Bunge, as did other scholars (e.g., Rosemann and Wyssusek 2005; Milton
2007), and acknowledged the existence of other constructs and more recent be-
liefs. As they note, Bunge “has written extensively about social phenomena using
constructs based upon his ontology” (Bunge 1998; Wand and Weber 2017). Yet,
much of the IT community adopted the views of Bunge stemming from BWW,
making this an important benchmark comparison.
4.3 SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BWW AND BSO
Based on the exposition of BSO, which captured more recent beliefs by Bunge in
comparison to BWW, we draw the comparisons summarized in Table 1 (see ap-
pendices).
First, it is evident that more recent thinking by Bunge remains partially con-
sistent with BWW. Table 1 compares BWW and BSO, demonstrating that many
ideas in BSO are the same as in BWW. These include the notion of things, prop-
erties, events, attributes, classes, laws. The relationships between many con-
structs remain the same (e.g., properties and attributes, properties and things).
Thus, BSO carries many of the same design implications for IT, as does BWW.
Included is the denial of the existence of properties, which has known implica-
tions for conceptual modeling research, such as problems of optional properties
or properties of properties (Bodart et al. 2001; Bodart and Weber 1996; Burton-
Jones and Weber 2003; Gemino and Wand 2005), emergence, and lack of direct
human access to reality (i.e., to the properties of systems).
Roman Lukyanenko, Veda C. Storey, Oscar Pastor | Foundations of Information Technology 19
Mεtascience | No.2 | online February 5, 2021
Second, many of the changes introduced by BSO could be handled by appro-
priate qualifications or more precise specifications of the already existing no-
tions (e.g., that concrete systems undergo change via energy transfer, but con-
ceptual systems do not). The notions of things and their properties are still
present because some systems can be viewed as systems for which no structure
is modeled (as we discussed earlier). The relationship between properties and
attributes can now be understood by the notion of phenomenon. Notably, how-
ever, as the example of properties and attributes demonstrates, in some re-
spects, BWW can be considered a subset of BSO, which abstracts from the rich-
ness and nuances of BSO but has greater parsimony.
Thus, there is an important continuity between BSO and BWW. This continu-
ity is critical for assessing the status of impressive theoretical, conceptual and
design research that stemmed from the ideas of Wand and Weber (1990a; 1993;
2017). Hence, BSO could still be used to posit that classes “tyrannize” instances
(Parsons and Wand 2000) or that optional properties should be proscribed (we
leave the issue of whether such design proposition is appropriate for conceptual
modeling outside our discussion). However, in BSO, this is true for concrete sys-
tems only, since conceptual systems do not follow the same principles as con-
crete ones do.
As with BWW, BSO continues to adhere to the tenets of scientific realism and
grounds thinking into interpretation of the state-of-the-art knowledge in physics
and other disciplines. The two ontologies are products of conceptualizing and
synthesizing knowledge about the nature of reality as derived meticulously from
what Bunge, as a physicist (Bunge, 1945), assumed to be tenets of science. This
makes the two ontologies especially valuable, as they promise to ground repre-
sentations of reality based on these ontologies into solid scientific beliefs,
thereby attempting to realize repeated calls of researchers to ground IT into
deeper, more fundamental foundations (Pastor 2016; Wand et al. 1995).
On the other hand, BSO covers more compared with BWW. We suggest, BSO
is not an expansion of BWW that could be achieved by simply adding epistemol-
ogy to BWW. Rather, BSO suggests a new way of thinking about reality. Further-
more, the basic tenet of BSO—the world is made of systems—departs remarka-
bly from BWW. Hence, BSO embeds ideas about systems at its very core, taking
it as its fundamental premise. As Bunge writes, this is not only an ontological,
but also a normative stance (Bunge 2017). It impels the users of his ontology to
proactively seek complexity beneath the seeming simplicity. It is in this
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complexity that Bunge sees a path for uncovering the fundamental nature of re-
ality. This is a core idea around which other elements revolve.
Furthermore, in BSO, Bunge made a concerted effort to shift the focus from
material things to physical, biological, social and mental systems. This is evi-
denced by the many new constructs that are not part of BWW (Table 1). BSO,
much more than BWW, is concerned with the relationship between physical and
mental phenomena, advancing numerous novel constructs, such as observer, ob-
servation, hypothesis, theory, and fact.
BSO further deepens the understanding of the relationship between funda-
mental constructs of BWW, such as classes, kinds and things, and properties and
attributes. In all cases, in order to gain a deeper understanding of this relation-
ship, a closer examination of the mental world of humans was required. Alt-
hough not examined in this paper in detail, Bunge also discusses social reality at
length, including engaging with ideas of Searle (Searle 1995). For example,
Bunge (1996) makes contributions to social ontology, which has been cited as a
limitation of BWW (e.g., March and Allen 2014).
When comparing BWW with BSO, we can also use the analogy of comparing
classical physics with quantum physics. Classical physics is applicable to macro-
scopic particles, providing a coarse-grained perspective of reality, but hiding the
microscopic world dimension that quantum physics analyzes. Since classical
physics can be derived from quantum physics in the limit that the quantum prop-
erties are hidden, BWW can be considered a simplification of the BSO when
BSO’s systemist perspective is reduced to material systems the internal com-
plexity of which is abstracted away. We can then interpret BWW as the begin-
ning of a fundamental way to represent reality. The BSO concepts provide a more
complete and refined knowledge of reality.
Considering the differences between earlier and more recent thinking of
Bunge, we therefore propose Bunge’s Systemist Ontology or BSO, as a new ontol-
ogy, and a new, practically applicable, addition to the theoretical toolbox of IT.
5 IMPLICATIONS OF BSO FOR AREAS OF IT
The comparison between BSO and BWW implies that the broader and more re-
cent ideas of Bunge carry exciting implications for ontology-based IT research
and practice.
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5.1 REINVIGORATING ONTOLOGICAL DEBATES IN IT
BSO contributes to the long-standing research on using Bunge’s ideas as theo-
retical foundations for IT. Bunge is among the most influential ontologists for the
fields of conceptual modeling, systems analysis and design, and software engi-
neering research. Bunge’s ideas were, not only at the core of BWW, but also used
widely in design and empirical studies on conceptual modeling (Evermann and
Wand 2006; Opdahl and Henderson-Sellers 2002; Pastor and Molina 2007; We-
ber 2003), business process modeling (Bider et al. 2005; Recker et al. 2011), in-
formation quality (Lukyanenko, Parsons, and Wiersma 2014; Lukyanenko, Par-
sons, et al. 2019; Wand and Wang 1996), data modeling and database design
(Parsons and Wand 2000; Wand, Storey, and Weber 1999; 1999), software en-
gineering (Pastor et al., 2008; Reinhartz-Berger et al., 2012), information sys-
tems requirements (Itzik, Reinhartz-Berger, and Wand 2015; Soffer et al. 2001;
Vessey 2004), and ontology engineering (Becker et al. 2010; Bera, Burton-Jones,
and Wand 2011). Bunge’s ideas have also been frequently used as a benchmark
for other ontologies and when analyzing the value of ontologies for IT (Guarino
1995; Guizzardi 2005; Wyssusek 2006).
Our research considers whether the ideas as expressed by BWW capture the
most recent thinking of Bunge. As our work suggests, Bunge makes broader and
deeper contributions than previously recognized. Although there is an overlap
between BWW and BSO, BSO contains many new ideas, and hence carries new
implications for the assessment of the applicability of Bunge for various disci-
plines of IT.
Future research could further examine the benefits and limitations of Bunge
more broadly (i.e., BWW and BSO) for conceptual modeling, information quality,
software engineering, and other areas which have thus far benefited from the
exposure to Bunge’s thought.
5.2 SUPPORTING MODELING IN NEW DOMAINS
With a new way of conceptualizing reality and additions of epistemological con-
structs, BSO should be able to support design and use beyond that of BWW. Us-
ing the iceberg metaphor for representation of reality enables a specific example
to be discussed. BWW provided the ontological basis of a conceptual program-
ming approach called “OO-Method” (Pastor & Molina 2007, Embley, Liddle &
Pastor, 2011), together with its associated industrial tool, Integranova. Concep-
tually, OO-Method focuses on organizational systems and their associated data-
base-based applications. It works well within this context, but, by considering
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BWW as the tip of the reality representation iceberg, several other systems ap-
pear to fall out its natural scope (e.g., deep learning reasoning, machine learning
algorithms, AI conceptual applications as Explainable AI). With the ontological
commitment provided by the “basic” BWW, it is very difficult to go beyond the
notion of an organizational system (taken from the FRISCO Manifesto, IFIP
WG 8.1. (Falkenberg et al. 1998)), that is a type of concrete system well-charac-
terized by using the “thing” concept of BWW. BWW can work well for represent-
ing the components of these concrete (material) systems, but it has difficulty
representing conceptual systems (i.e., conceptual components of those organi-
zational systems, as algorithms, functions, theories).
For BSO, that hidden part of the reality representation becomes accessible,
especially through the explicit distinction between concrete and conceptual sys-
tems, and the coverage of reality beyond sensations, as well as the consideration
of facts as being largely submerged under the surface of immediate sensory ex-
perience. All of these notions provide a way to understand the conceptual fun-
damentals of deep learning, machine learning, and any other conceptual (not
concrete) system that BSO distinguished explicitly. For instance, applying BSO
to neural networks could be considered as a connection between a concrete sys-
tem (composed by other systems) and a conceptual system. An example is a neu-
ral algorithm that takes an image (for computer-based neural networks) or a
perception (for human-based ones) of a concrete system as input and deter-
mines what systems are present in the image/perception as output.
The many new ideas of Bunge represented in BSO can provide a strong onto-
logical foundation for many emerging applications in IT. To illustrate, we suggest
two notable examples of potential applications of BSO into domains of applied
machine learning based on complex models, such as deep learning and into ex-
plainable artificial intelligence.
Deep learning applications could benefit from BSO as this domain is based on
a strong conceptual (but not material) basis. Deep learning is a type of machine
learning that uses neural networks with multiple hidden layers, resulting in
highly complex, but also very powerful models (Bishop 2006). These models
tend to capture what mostly corresponds to the tacit knowledge humans pos-
sess. This task requires the use of purely conceptual notions (high-level seman-
tic variables) whose representation and reasoning capabilities form the basis for
natural language communication and express algorithmic knowledge in soft-
ware (Bengio 2020). Hence, it is difficult to reason about the systems based on
deep learning on the basis of a purely materialistic ontology. In contrast, BSO has
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more nuanced conceptual constructs, such as unobservable facts, hypotheses,
observation and, broadly, the notion of hidden versus observable. These all ap-
pear to be of value for reasoning and modeling deep learning applications, as a
future area of research.
Explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) is a socio-technical challenge due to
the growing need to allow a machine to precisely explain a taken decision (Doši-
lović, Brčić, and Hlupić 2018; Gunning and Aha 2019). It is, therefore, crucial to
obtain a shared understanding of the domain under consideration (Lukyanenko,
Castellanos, et al. 2019; Lukyanenko et al. 2020), what again requires a concep-
tualization process that is hard to achieve using only the concrete (material) fun-
damental background that the original BWW provides. On the contrary, BSO pro-
vides constructs to support the characterization of a conventional XAI-based
process (Spreeuwenberg 2019). Here, after designing the shared conceptual
model, the task must be understood, the right scope selected, and the right data
collected and its quality improved. In addition, the AI techniques that deliver re-
sults must be selected, in order to generate good explanations that adequately
evolve over time. All of this is challenging and, obviously, requires future re-
search, which could benefit from the idea captured in BSO.
5.3 EVALUATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF MODELING GRAMMARS
The new constructs of BSO can also become valuable in evaluation (and possibly,
development of new) conceptual modeling grammars. To illustrate one oppor-
tunity, recall that in BSO systems can be material or conceptual. For BSO, a criti-
cal demarcation is the absence of presence of energy, and the nature of energy
exchange between systems. The nature of energy is a new consideration for con-
ceptual modeling research and practice. As Bunge (2006) argues, depending on
the type of energy transfer, different interactions among systems become possi-
ble. If we model systems using, for example, classes in the UML grammar, the
interaction among classes can be modeled using the association construct. How-
ever, this construct does not distinguish the types of energy that is being trans-
ferred during the interaction among the objects (instances of the classes).
Consider an example of an online order delivery domain (with a fragment of
a possible diagram shown in Figure 1 in which real-world complexities are ab-
stracted away). The diagram, which uses a UML notation, represents a domain
with three kinds of real-world systems from the point of view of BSO: customers,
orders and delivery drivers (with their internal complexity abstracted away for
the purposes of the illustration). Their interactions are shown using the
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association construct. However, the nature of the interaction differs due to the
different kinds of energy being transferred. In the case of a customer placing an
order, it, presumably, involves the use of a mobile app over the Internet. In the
case of a delivery driver, it involves an actual physical displacement, frequently
at a considerable distance, guided by the mobile app and supported by other ma-
chinery and tools, which, in turn, also consume specific kinds of energy. Thus,
the energy flow and energy requirements of the two associations differ in re-
markable ways. Recognizing these differences could lead to a different appreci-
ation for the kinds of resources needed to enact, manage and support the inter-
actions of these systems. Many kinds of valuable inferences can be drawn from
the knowledge of the nature of energy transfer between the systems (e.g., that
delivery drivers require fuel, whereas customers require a stable Internet con-
nection and enough battery charge in their cellphones). Each of these inferences
can prove beneficial for building effective information technologies which sup-
port and enable interactions of systems in this delivery domain.
Figure 1: Fragment of a hypothetical UML diagram in an online order delivery domain
The notion of energy is new to conceptual modeling research. Therefore, fu-
ture studies are needed to explore the implications of this new idea. Modifica-
tions to existing modeling grammars may also be needed to allow constructs that
represent associations among systems to capture the different kinds of energy
transfer, if such capture proves to be valuable for modeling purposes.
5.4 SUPPORT AND GUIDANCE FOR NOVEL DESIGN PATTERNS
Some of the design implications of BSO, while not necessarily requiring modifi-
cations to modeling grammars, may be useful as best design practices or design
templates. To appreciate this potential, consider the fact that BSO provides sev-
eral new ontological constructs—ontological primitives, including observation,
hypothesis, and fact. These constructs of BSO appear particularly useful for a va-
riety of modern applications; for example, the observation construct can,
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potentially, be used to model scenarios where people observe some things in
reality and post these on social media.
These ontological primitives will not likely require a modification to existing
conceptual modeling grammars, as they can be modeled as classes, or entities
using grammars such as UML, ER or ORM and incorporated into existing model-
ing grammars as modeling patterns. The notion of a modeling pattern has been
adapted in conceptual modeling research (Garzotto et al. 1999) from the field of
architecture and “describes a problem which occurs over and over again in our
environment, and then describes the core of the solution to that problem, in such
a way that you can use this solution a million times over” (Alexander 1977).
Likewise, BSO can contribute a variety of new design patterns. Figure 2 de-
picts one such possible pattern using UML, in which an observation in a domain
is modeled (again with real-world complexities abstracted away, for the pur-
poses of the illustration). In addition to modeling the observation object itself,
the contribution of BSO is to suggest modeling conceptual and concrete tools
used to make the observation. Such pattern, for example, can be used for model-
ing social media applications where an observation can be an observation of a
hotel (within the context of submitting a review). An app designed following the
modeling pattern in Figure 2 can also capture whether there are any photo-
graphs made along with the observation (i.e., corresponding to the concrete tool
object), and also goals, assumptions, biases and intentions of the person making
the observation (i.e., the conceptual tool). Such modeling pattern can facilitate
the collection of more complete information, which allows for better interpreta-
tion of social media data. Future research can consider such design patterns, as
well as propose and evaluate any new ones.
Figure 2: Pattern based on BSO illustrating typical observation made within a domain
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As another case of useful design patterns, BSO provides new and expanded
expressiveness for modeling systems. Consider, for example, the relationship
between things and systems. In contrast to BWW’s emphasis on unique things,
BSO highlights the importance of representing structure, relationships between
systems, emergence, levels, and interactions among subsystems. In BSO, Bunge
clearly wishes to balance his views between the value an individual-focused per-
spective may bring versus a perspective that is more sensitive to the whole.
Information systems development, including conceptual modeling and user
interface design, can incorporate Bunge’s CESM model (composition, environ-
ment, structure and mechanism) as a modeling pattern for describing systems
and capturing user information regarding systems. Thus, a conceptual model of
a domain can contain and represent elements consistent with CESM and incor-
porate them into conceptual modeling grammars as constructs. Then, for exam-
ple, a project interested in recording data on some systems (e.g., sales, custom-
ers, markets, or natural phenomena, such as climate) could represent internal
structures of the observed system, its relationship with its outer environment,
its levels of composition, and the components and specificity of subsystems.
To illustrate further, consider a citizen science project (Bonney et al. 2009;
Castellanos et al. 2020; Lukyanenko, Wiggins, and Rosser 2019), which involves
collecting citizen observations of lichens (a focal system of interest). Following
BSO, the analysts could produce data collection interfaces and requisite data-
base structures that capture: citizen observations of the structure of the lichens
observed; the hosts to which the lichens are attached (its environment) and
other external systems (e.g., the ecosystem); the individual strands that make up
a collection of lichens (its components); and the properties of individual strands
of lichens. By adopting the CESM modeling pattern or template, the citizen sci-
ence projects can collect more complete data on systems of interest, thus in-
creasing the potential of such data for insights and actions.
Many studies that follow early work of Bunge base modeling choices on the
assumption of the primacy of individuals in logical database design, conceptual
modeling grammars, information quality, and design collection processes (Par-
sons and Wand 2000; Lukyanenko et al. 2017; Lukyanenko, Parsons, and Samuel
2019; Samuel, Khatri, and Ramesh 2018). Bunge extensively discusses the limi-
tations of an individual-focused perspective and suggests that a more balanced
approach—one that considers both individuals and collectives—may be more
fruitful (Bunge 1996; 2000). BSO seeks to promote such balanced perspective,
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and thus can pave the way to even more expressive conceptual modeling gram-
mars and IT designs realized in future studies.
5.5 WORK ON FORMALIZING BSO AND EVALUATING ITS IMPLICATIONS
Much work remains to study BSO in its own right, including formalizing BSO into
a finite set of postulates (analogous to Wand and Weber (1990b)). Part of this
effort should involve ensuring the final ontology is internally consistent; for ex-
ample, BSO’s notion of event is defined based on things, rather than systems. The
work should also continue investigating areas of IT practice that could benefit
from the application of these ideas.
Although not directly engaging with conceptual modeling in IT, Bunge inves-
tigated issues of technology design and representations in science (Bunge 1974;
1985; 2019). In these writings, he briefly considered the implications of his on-
tology for representing reality in artifacts, including social policy plans or archi-
tectural blueprints. Here, Bunge (1985, 7:244) suggested that “a design or plan
is defective if it overlooks any of the three features of any system: its composi-
tion, environment or structure (both internal and external)” (emphasis
added).13 Thus, Bunge, himself, believed his ontology should be incorporated
into design and action models and advanced an empirical claim that these mod-
els would be defective otherwise. This is a strong assertion that will require fu-
ture research to corroborate or falsify.
6 CONCLUSION
The philosopher Mario Bunge made a profound impact on the fields of concep-
tual modeling, software engineering, information quality, and database design.
Much of this influence has been via the BWW ontology, which has made substan-
tial contributions to the theory and practice of IT and conceptual modeling.
Recognizing that there are many concepts and ideas that have deep implica-
tions for understanding the reality that IT needs to model, we conducted a mul-
tiyear analysis of Bunge’s writings, which included personal consultations with
Bunge. As a result, we gained a new perspective on the ideas and beliefs of
Bunge. These ideas do not constitute a mere expansion of prior work. Rather, we
synthesized the recent thinking of Bunge in the new ontology, the Bunge
13 Here, we see a reference to the CESM model (composition, environment, structure), but the mechanism
as a component was only developed by Bunge in the early 2000s, and thus is missing from this passage
written in 1985.
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Systemist Ontology or BSO. Parts of BWW and BSO overlap precisely, so an im-
portant continuity between ontological work based on Bunge in IT is preserved.
In addition, BSO promises new opportunities for IT as it orients the modeling
efforts from individuals to systems, and ushers in much greater consideration of
epistemology and axiology. Hence, a new ontology is warranted.
BSO contains concepts that can raise new prospects and possibilities for in-
formation technology, including for conceptual modeling, software engineering,
ontology engineering and other areas of IT. We detail some of these possibilities
in a set of research opportunities that focus on further discovering and applying
the philosophical works of Bunge. In the world which deepens its reliance on IT,
these new ideas of Mario Bunge could prove useful for further improving the
way IT represents and shapes reality.
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7 APPENDICES: COMPARISON BETWEEN FOUNDATIONAL CONSTRUCTS OF BWW AND BSO
Comparison between foundational constructs of BWW and BSO*
Construct Definition from BWW* Definition from BSO Comparison and Analysis
Thing “A thing is the elementary unit in our onto-
logical model. The real world is made up of
things. A composite thing may be made up
of other composite things or primitive
things”
N/A In BWW thing is the fundamental ontologi-
cal primitive which stands in its own. In
BWW a system is a kind of a thing—a thing
that has structure. In BSO, we suggest all
things to be systems (note our caveat re el-
ementary particles explained above)
System “A set of things is a system if, for any bi-
partitioning of the set, coupling exist
among things in the two subsets”
“complex object every part or component
of which is connected with other parts of
the same object in such a manner that the
whole possesses some features that its
components lack—that is, emergent prop-
erties” (Bunge 1996, 20)
In BWW system is understood in terms of
things—the fundamental ontological prim-
itives. In BSO, thing is defined in terms of a
system, a thing is a kind of system
Property “Things are known via their properties. A
property maps the thing into some value”
The substance (matter and energy) that
make concrete systems what they are and
predicates of conceptual systems (Bunge
2017, 175)
Neither BSO nor BWW have formal notions
of property. Bunge’s recent writings (e.g.,
Bunge 2017, 175) re-iterated his early
ideas that properties do not exist in them-
selves and propertyless entities also do not
exist. The new notion of energy in BSO
gives the property concept more formality,
albeit it only applies to concrete systems
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Comparison between foundational constructs of BWW and BSO*
Construct Definition from BWW* Definition from BSO Comparison and Analysis
Emergent
property
“A property of a composite thing that be-
longs to a component thing is called a he-
reditary property. A property that does not
belong to any of the composing things is
called an emergent property”
“To say that P is an emergent property of
systems of kind K is short for “P is a global
[or collective or non-distributive] property
of a system of kind K, none of whose com-
ponents or precursors possess P” (Bunge
2003, 25)
Emergent property has undergone a shift
from BWW to BSO, wherein the latter on-
tology defines it as property of systems
State “The vector of values for all properties of a
thing is the state of the thing”
“list of properties of the [system at a given
instant of time]” (Bunge 2017, 171)
In BWW and BSO state has the same mean-
ing
History “The chronologically-ordered states that a
thing traverses in time are the history of
the thing”
“a sequence of states [of a system]” (Bunge
1996, 24)
Same notion, only applied to systems
Subsystem “A subsystem is a system whose composi-
tion and structure are subsets of the com-
position and structure of another system
and whose environment is a subset of the
environment of the other system in union
with the things that are in the composition
of the other system but not in the composi-
tion of the subsystem”
“[system] is “both a system and part of an-
other system” (Bunge 1996, 270)
The construct is the same in BWW and
BSO. Note, BWW’s version is consistent
with the systemist approach (i.e., subsys-
tems are systems)
Event “An event in a thing is a change of state” “Event C in thing A causes event E in thing
B if and only if the occurrence of C gener-
ates an energy transfer from A to B result-
ing in the occurrence of E” (Bunge 2006,
91)
The construct is the same in BWW and
BSO. Note the inconsistency in BSO, as
event is still defined in terms of things, ra-
ther than systems
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Comparison between foundational constructs of BWW and BSO*
Construct Definition from BWW* Definition from BSO Comparison and Analysis
Class Set of things sharing “a common property” Systems with “one or more” common
properties (Bunge 1996, 111)
Notable change in BSO of conceptualizing
classes as (conceptual) systems
Kind Set of things which share “two or more”
properties
Classes with properties which are interre-
lated (Bunge 2006, 13)
A change in BSO which stipulate kinds to
have interrelated properties—a notion
more consistent with definition of natural
kinds by other researchers (Fletcher 2013;
Hacking 1991)
Process N/A “sequence, ordered in time, of events such
that every member of the sequence takes
part in the determination of the succeed-
ing member” (Bunge 2017, 172)
New construct in BSO
Phenome-
non
N/A “is an event or a process such as it appears
to some human subject: it is a perceptible
fact” (Bunge 2017, 173)
New construct in BSO
Fact N/A “whatever is the case, i.e., anything that is
known or assumed—with some ground—
to belong to reality” (Bunge 2017, 171)
New construct in BSO
Object N/A “whatever is or may become a subject of
thought or action” (Bunge 2017, 174)
New construct in BSO
Observabil-
ity
N/A “x is observable only if there exist at least
one recording instrument w, one set of cir-
cumstances y, and one set of observation
tools z, such that we can register x under y
helped by z” (Bunge 2017, 185)
New construct in BSO
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Comparison between foundational constructs of BWW and BSO*




N/A “purposeful and enlightened perception:
purposeful or deliberate because it is made
with a given definite aim; enlightened be-
cause it is somehow guided by a body of
knowledge” (Bunge 2017, 181)





N/A “hypothetical inference employing both
observational data and hypotheses”
(Bunge 2017, 181)
New construct in BSO
Observer N/A “subject [of observation]” (Bunge 2017,
184)




N/A corrigible proposition about yet unexperi-
enced or in principle unexperientable facts
(Bunge 1998, 254)
New construct in BSO
Theory N/A “a system of propositions some of which
are hypothesized and the remainder of
which are deduced from the former”
(Bunge 1996, 113)
New construct in BSO
* Note, the comparison is based on constructs from BWW as provided in Wand and Weber (1993, 222–23). Some constructs of BSO (e.g., process, fact)
have been part of the Treatise, but were not included in that original source for BWW
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